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The railway with its powerful steam locomotives fascinated and impressed our ancestors in much the same way 
that a Space Shuttle flight impresses us today… For the first time in human history, the railway freed travel 
from the constraints of human and animal muscle power and even the constraints of geography (Schivelbusch, 
1987:1). 
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Abstract 
Economic activities such as mining extraction and farming have in the past been supported by 
railway infrastructure, which continues to provide a cheap transportation option for the 
movement of freight. This research paper looks at the apparent bias that exists in the shared-use 
of railway infrastructure in South Africa between coal miners and citrus growers in 
Mpumalanga. The study is specifically concerned with the regulatory regime governing access 
and the extent to which it enables or hinders the shared-use of rail infrastructure, which is 
critical in the movement of freight for different sectors of the economy. The paper uses 
literature on regulatory practices and a case study of Mpumalanga’s coal miners and citrus 
growers, to investigate South Africa’s regulatory regime and its role in creating particular 
biases in the use of rail infrastructure.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Historically, railways set the pace for the industrial revolution in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century in 
Europe and North America and played a crucial role in the socio-economic transformation 
from rural to industrial societies (Mckillop and Pearson, 1997). According to Collier 
(2011:18) “railways are the oldest continuous industrial technology” where the construction 
and maintenance of substantial railway systems has been a major catalyst in bringing 
modernity and industrial growth to the Third World. Herranz-Loncan (2011) makes the point 
that railways have (i) led to huge increases in aggregate productivity, market integration and 
labor mobility (ii) increased the stock of exploitable natural resources in mineral rich 
economies and (iii) stimulated the inflow of foreign capital and investment. Rail transport has 
always been identified as an efficient transport mode in the movement of people and freight 
(PPIAF, 2012). Therefore, this research paper has been motivated by issues around shared 
use of rail infrastructure between two different sectors of the South African economy, more 
specifically coal miners and citrus growers. Shared use refers to the ability for all sectors, 
both mineral and non-mineral to be able to access rail infrastructure without difficulty when 
demanded. Mineral and non-mineral users use rail infrastructure as part of an integrated 
network that facilitates in the coordination and promotion of economic activity both 
domestically and internationally (Toledano, 2012).  
In South Africa rail infrastructure dominates the mining sector in terms of freight 
carriage and an example would be the extensive rail network transporting export coal to the 
Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT) (Nel et al. 2004). The coal industry is predominantly 
the most important customer for South Africa’s rail network. The eMalahleni (Witbank) 
coalfields are an important center for South Africa’s current coal mining activity with about 
55 collieries in operation (Banks et al. 2011). However, apart from mining, agriculture is also 
one of the largest economic sectors in Mpumalanga. According to the Provincial Growth 
Strategy and Development Strategy (2005) the agricultural sector is the second largest 
employer in the province behind mining and is a key driver in terms of job creation and 
economic growth. In 2012 the agricultural sectors contribution to Mpumalanga’s GDP (gross 
domestic product) (at constant 2005 prices) was 3.4% and although the sector's contribution 
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to the province's GDP declined from 4.2% in 1996 to 3.5% in 2010, it still maintained a 
comparative advantage over the same industry in the national economy (Mpumalanga Socio-
Economic Outlook, 2013). However, because much of South Africa’s economic activity has 
been centred around mining this presents a potential problem for other sectors, such as 
agriculture, to access rail infrastructure. The challenge to greater access can be attributed to 
the historic patterns of investment in rail infrastructure due to increased mining activities that 
have led to this sector dominating the use of rail services to the disadvantage of other users.  
Brooke (2010) argues that rail services would function much better for citrus growers 
if there were for instance improved cost structures and coordination of rail activities similar 
to those afforded to the mining sector. Although efforts have been made to address these 
issues by the railway service provider, the citrus growers still do not have a seamless 
movement of cargo between two points like that of coal miners. Literature attributes this to a 
number of factors, such as freight costs, the modal characteristics, the commodity 
characteristics and economic regulation governing access to infrastructure. Vieira (1992) 
states that, in terms of freight movement, the mode that provides the minimum costs is often 
the one used by shippers. Therefore in response, freight transport tries to be as competitive as 
possible when it comes to their cost structure (Cambridge Systematics, 2013). However, 
despite favourable pricing the regulatory regime appears to have an overarching influence in 
terms of access to rail infrastructure. This is reiterated by Lapuerta and Moselle (1999), 
Campos and Cantos (2000) and Drew (2004), who explore the regulatory environment of 
network industries in their various capacities. The regulatory framework determines the rules 
that participants must adhere to in their activities. Therefore the research paper will focus on 
how the regulatory framework governing freight rail infrastructure has contributed to the 
biases in accessing rail amongst coal miners and citrus growers in South Africa.   
 
1.2 Research Problem  
Where there are presumed biases in accessing rail infrastructure, there exist challenges for 
sectors, such as mining and agriculture that require rail in the movement of their goods. This 
apparent bias has been principally explained through issues relating to modal choice that 
place emphasis on freight costs, modal characteristics and commodity characteristics. Vieira 
(1992), Cambridge Systematics (2013), Van der Mescht (2006) and Stander and Pienaar 
(2002) and Cook et al. (1999) have written extensively about this social phenomenon. Cheap 
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and reliable transport such as railways help ease costs for producers because “many 
commodities are traded at world market prices and transport costs come out of producer 
profits, thus low costs can help marginal producers to be more competitive” (PPIAF, 2012). 
Table 1 below gives a comparison of cost structures between rail and road. As 
illustrated, in the case of citrus, rail is often characterised by lower line-haul costs over long 
distances compared to trucks, which are more cost effective over short distances (Van der 
Mescht, 2006). However, given the large volumes of citrus being transported in South Africa, 
the cost structure for citrus from point of production to ports shows that rail is the better 
option but there has been a decline in export volumes transported by rail for the citrus 
industry from 80% in 2000 to 5% in 2009 (Brooke, 2010).  
 
Table 1: TRANSPORT COSTS CALCULATION 2011 
TFR Rail Price from Head to Port (Durban) 
Rail Price per Wagon = 24 pallets per Wagon 
Both Standard Height Pallets & High Cube Pallets  
Hoedspruit 
Siding 
Letsitele Siding  Letsitele Siding Polokwane Siding 
R4 600 R6 200 R13 200 R11 750 
Cost per Truck load = 24 pallets per Truck (7 Axle Trucks) 
Both Standard Height Pallets & High Cube Pallets  
Region Durban by Road 
Hoedspruit R12 000 
Zebidiela R17 600 
Dendron R17 600 
Letsitele R14 500 
Pont Drift R19 800 
Tshipise R19 800 
    Source: CGA 2012 
Stander and Pienaar (2002) further point that shippers tend to attach a high value to the 
quality of service rather than to the costs, because the quality of the service has a direct 
impact on the efficient flow of freight from one point to another. Shippers tend to give 
preference to faster and more reliable modes (PPIAF, 2012), depending on the characteristics 
of the commodity being shipped, such as shipment size, shipment perishability and shipment 
density (Cambridge Systematics, 2013). Commodities with a short shelf life, such as citrus, 
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that are time sensitive would require a faster and more reliable mode (Brooke, 2010) than 
dense commodities like coal. Therefore examining commodity types and their characteristics 
enables shippers to negotiate for timely, reliable and high value service.  
However, in some instances there exists a “Cross Over” group of goods whose 
characteristics are suited for any type of mode (CUTR, n.d). Table 2 below considers two 
products: coal and agriculture and two groupings are considered: 
1. Those with a very low/no shift potential, and  
2. Those with possible significant shift potential 
 
Table 2: Coal and Agricultural Produce Shift Potential between modes 
Very Low/No Shift Potential 
COMMODITY  REASON SHIFT IS/IS NOT POTENTIAL KEY FACTORS IN 
MODE-CHOICE 
DECISION 
MOST 
LIKELY 
MODE 
COAL  No shift required. Most tonnage shipped 
by rail and water. 
 Bulky  
 Not perishable 
 Long distance  
 Transportation 
charges  
 Shipment density  
 Shipment value  
Rail, Water  
Possible Significant Shift Potential 
AGRICULTURE   Predominantly shipped by truck. 
 Cross Elasticity for a 5% decrease in truck 
costs is 13.79 for rail. This is very high – 
rail need to work hard to keep agriculture 
customers (Beuthe, Jourquin, Geerts and 
Koul 2000). 
 Possibly bulky. 
 Possibly perishable. 
 Food is very varied. Bulk/unfinished food 
especially would have more of a shift 
potential. 
 Bulk food has a much lower Cross 
Elasticity for rail if truck prices decreased 
than finished foods (Cambridge 
Systematics 1995). 
 Food has been known to convert to rail 
(Morlok 1994). 
 Food is a commodity that trucks and 
railways compete for (Jiocco 1998). 
 Transportation 
charges. 
 Package 
characteristics. 
  Distance of 
shipment. 
 Trip time and 
reliability. 
 Handling quality. 
 Shipment shelf life. 
Bulk Food – Rail 
 
Finished Foods– 
Truck, Rail, 
Intermodal 
Water, 
Truck, Rail  
 
Bulky & 
Non-perishable –
Rail 
Source: CUTR (n.d) 
 
This table depicts citrus as having a “cross over quality” and coal as not having this quality 
due to particular commodity characteristics. While this literature is valid, it does not explain 
the sources of why citrus would chose to move to road transportation other than stating that 
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this is due to better service. Therefore the literature on modal choice alone can not explain the 
causes of this bias. 
 On the contrary, literature on regulation looks at the contribution of the regulatory 
framework in creating biases to access rail infrastructure and this may include poor service. 
Lapuerta and Moselle (1999), Brown et al. (2006), Nowotny (1998) and Drew (2004) address 
these issues of regulation. Lapuerta and Moselle (1999) discuss two methods of accessing  
infrastructure - regulated access and negotiated access. However the weaknesses of these two 
methods often leads to foreclosure as network owners may deny access to their networks. 
Brown et al. (2006) and Nowotny (1998) then emphasise the need for regulation, to monitor 
and establish the rules of entry, for both old and new participants. However, this literature 
does not show how faults in the regulatory regime have reproduced biases.   
Thus, the overall research problem seeks to shed more light on the following research 
question, 
To what extent does the regulatory regime in charge of access to rail infrastructure enable 
or hinder shared use of rail infrastructure? 
 
This presents one with the opportunity to add on to and bridge the gap in knowledge that 
seeks to see an improvement in freight rail activities for both the mining and agricultural 
sectors in South Africa. By examining cases that show how faults in the regulatory regime 
have reproduced biases that hinder or enable shared use of rail infrastructure.  
 
1.3 Hypothesis  
The domination of rail freight by the South African minerals sector that leads to a bias in the 
usage of rail infrastructure can be explained by testing the following hypothesis: 
 In terms of access to rail infrastructure the ownership structure, either private or state 
owned, through its patterns of regulation has a significant bearing in enabling or 
hindering shared use of rail infrastructure.  
 The regulatory regimes historical patterns of investment mean that mines have the 
appropriate infrastructure in place (physical factors and asset productivity) and have 
an advantage of proximity to rail infrastructure, which makes it easier for the 
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coordination of rail activities as opposed to farms (citrus plantations) that require such 
investment given their fragmented locations. 
This hypothesis will be addressed specifically through examination of rail infrastructure and 
its usage in Mpumalanga province. 
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
 To assess and explain the apparent bias in the usage of rail infrastructure in South 
Africa between mineral and non-mineral users, more specifically between coal and 
citrus growers.  
 To gain a deeper understanding into South Africas rail network regulatory regime and 
its implications on the overall movement of freight at a sectorial level.  
 To stimulate future debate on the topic, of the relevance of shared use of infrastructure 
and what implications this could have on the broader spheres of socio-economic 
development which often rely on infrastructure such as rail to harness growth 
potentials.  
 
1.5 Research Approach and Method  
 
This research looks into the regulatory framework that governs the use of rail infrastructure in 
an attempt to better explain the apparent bias that exists in the usage of rail infrastructure 
between citrus growers and coal miners. The research used both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of enquiry. Quantitative especially in gathering data on rail, such as tariffs, service 
costs, access pricing, volumes of commodities on rail, investment and revenue figures and the 
qualitative methods mainly due to the fact that, understanding a situation is gained from a 
holistic perspective (Hancock, 1998). For instance, it is concerned with the opinions, 
experiences and feelings of individuals. The methods employed evolved around interviews, 
synthesis of previous studies sourced from library materials such as books, reports, laws, 
regulations and articles or papers presented, relating to the subject matter. In-depth interviews 
with key personnel were conducted, among both the mineral (coal miner) and non-mineral 
(Citrus growers) users of rail infrastructure. Officials from the governing body that operates 
this infrastructure, which is Transnet, were also approached to gain more insight into the 
operations and use of rail infrastructure. In essence, interviews and documentary analysis 
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were used to establish reasons for modal choice and to understand the operations of the 
regulatory regime. 
 
1.5.1 Case study  
The Mpumalanga province presents a strong case study in showing how the agricultural and 
mining sectors interact in terms of the usage of rail infrastructure in the region. The emphasis 
of the case study in this research was used as a means of examining a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context (Yin, 1981). Most importantly as Gunmmesson (2003: 
488) notes, case studies give a full and rich description of relationships between different 
events and factors in the system, and as stated above this case study combined multiple data 
collection methods. The study focused more specifically on citrus growers and coal miners in 
the Mpumalanga regions of eMalahleni, Nelspruit, Eilandshoek, Thekwane, Ngodwana and 
Bushbuckridge. However, a more in-depth description and analysis of the case study is 
covered in chapter 3.  
 
1.5.2 Operationalisation  
Operationalisation is the process of identifying indicators or a set of criteria reflective of the 
concept and often the indicators selected must have a logical link with the concept (Kumar, 
1999). This paper looks at the apparent bias in the usage of rail infrastructure more 
specifically in the context of the economic regulatory system governing access to the rail 
networks. Therefore, the theoretical framework of the regulatory school was used to 
operationalise this bias. Table 3 shows the indicators selected to explain this bias.   
1. What is the regulatory framework that governs South Africa’s freight rail? 
2. Does the regulatory regime in place allow for multi-user access to rail infrastructure? 
In terms of access pricing, access rights and long term development 
provisions/investment.  
3. What investments as well as standing infrastructure, now and before exist[s][ed] to 
ensure the sustained use of rail infrastructure for either coal miners or citrus growers? 
 
 
8 
 
Table 3: Operationalisation table 
Specific Research Question Indicators/Questions Data Source 
Point 1 and 2  Regulation provisions 
  
 Policy documents  
 Rail Acts  
 Transnet regulatory framework  
 Regulatory Handbooks  
 Government working papers 
 Interviews 
Point 3  Investment decisions on 
capital expenditure over time  
 Price setting 
 Rail lines  
 Volumes  
 Tariff setting 
 Interviews  
 Annual reports  
 Financial Statements  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Literature review 
 
The aim of this section is to review the available literature on how shared use of rail 
infrastructure is best managed. Shared use of infrastructure is partly determined by who owns 
the particular infrastructure, either through the government as a public monopoly, through 
private investment or through partnerships. This in itself is imbedded in a deeper debate of 
the state versus market. Therefore, the first part of this literature review briefly outlines the 
historical shift towards expanded private sector involvement in the provision of public 
infrastructure. This is followed by a look into the progression leading to the need for 
economic regulation. In the second part, building on from the historical timeline focus is on 
the developments in the rail sector as a result of de-regulation as well as the alternate 
structures that have since developed apart from full private ownership, more so, given the 
case of South Africa’s corporatized rail network. 
 
2.1 Ownership Status and History: State - Market Debate  
Historically issues around regulation and ownership within infrastructure services and 
operations stem from broader debates around privatization that came to the fore in the 1990s, 
a shift in policy from public to private. A transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
more market oriented one. A key debate that is at the center of privatisation is that of the state 
versus the market. On the one side advocates for the market such as John Williamson (1993), 
Peter Bauer (1974), Deepak Lal (1983) and James Scott (1998) were of the view that if left 
alone to operate freely the market alone could lead to increased efficiency and competition 
thereby solving the problems of underdevelopment. The state was viewed as a barrier to 
increased efficiency within the spheres of economic activity hence it had to take a secondary 
role. So with many countries recording negative growth rates in the 1970s this began to incite 
a need for more private participation in the spheres of government.  
Megginson and Netter (2001:7), state “the economic theory of privatisation is a subset 
of the large literature on the economics of ownership and the role of government ownership / 
regulation of the productive resources.” Put in a simple way, privatisation was a reform 
strategy formulated to help curb the poor performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
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This meant that the existence of single state monopoly firms had to be relinquished to pave 
way for private investors that would facilitate the spread of market fundamentalism in the 
operations of state infrastructure (Lapuerta and Moselle, 1999). The argument behind this 
was that macro economic instability had been caused in many countries by excessive state 
intervention and so the solution was to stabilise, liberalise and privatise in order to reduce the 
states role in the economy. This was the sole remedy for structural adjustment in Africa and 
Latin America, which faced a debt crisis in the 1990s and was the standard reform for 
communist economies particularly in Central Europe and Eastern Europe that underwent 
democratisation.  
However, despite the envisaged outcomes of the pro-market movement, such as 
improved efficiency and quality of service delivery through competition and / or clever 
regulation (Zhou, 2000), this view has been rejected by some authors who claim that most of 
the policies to come out of this, often found themselves clashing with public policy because 
some infrastructures are natural monopolies and may require some state involvement in order 
to ensure that social returns are maximised over private returns that increase prices and 
constrain output. Becirovic et al. (2011) points out that public ownership ensures that services 
of the utility sector are provided to marginalised areas that are often not cost-effective for 
private companies.  Lin (2012) further suggests that the state is able to establish regulatory 
roles through the establishment of rules and ensuring that private gains are compatible with 
social objectives. In essence state capabilities are needed to ensure that socio-economic 
interventions such as infrastructure provision add net value to development Khan (2011).   
This also shows that striking a balance between market led and state led infrastructure 
provision becomes complex and understanding some of the relationships that are born out of 
these complexities is subject to further research, but Layne (2000: 24) concludes the 
following  
“Business does some things better than government but government does some things better than 
business...the public sector tends to be better at policy management, regulatory activities, ensuring 
equity and social cohesion…the private sector tends to be better at performing economic tasks, 
innovating, replicating successful experiments, adapting to rapid change, and abandoning unsuccessful 
or obsolete activities.” 
With this in mind Ghosh (1992) makes the point that the market cannot function without the 
state and in turn the pattern of the development of the market would depend essentially on the 
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nature of the state. This is inline with what David Harvey (2007) mentions about the state 
versus market dichotomy in that, the market says that the state should not be involved in the 
operations of the market but in reality the market quite often needs the state to create more 
space for it to act. So, despite conflicting arguments from both schools, the two somewhat 
need each other in certain spheres of economic activity such as infrastructural provision and 
development. 
 
2.1.1 Private Participation and the Development of Economic Regulation 
With the state assuming a secondary role, the success of privatisation lay in increasing 
efficiency levels and competition. Thus, most traditional single state monopoly firms began 
to restructure inline with the codes and ethics of the market, which involved increased private 
participation in major sectors of the economy. However, critiques have argued that a change 
in ownership from public to private did not necessarily lead to increased efficiency gains let 
alone competition (Becirovic et al. 2011). Becirovic et al. (2011) mention that from the start 
there was a widespread growth of private monopolies particularly in those industries with 
high fixed costs, more specifically infrastructure industries, like railways, 
telecommunications, water and electricity supply. However, the monopoly power exercised 
by some industries prevented the development of competitors as the dominant players tended 
to foreclose the market from competition; new comers were either crowded out or simply 
denied access. Becirovic et al (2011:25) point out that  
“Not the change in ownership leads to an improvement of efficiency of former state-owned companies, 
but the introduction of competition, where competition did not exist or was limited.” 
So in essence the monopolies that existed or were being created after the de-regulation 
process of the 1990s tended to foreclose the market, limiting the opportunities for 
competition as access was denied. Therefore, the argument is that even after the post 
deregulation phase the probability of foreclosure still remained high amongst industries that 
had a monopolistic advantage, regardless of being under state or private ownership. It then 
followed that there was a need for economic regulation to monitor access to infrastructure 
(Lapuerta and Moselle, 1998), in terms of is access pricing, access rights and long-term 
developments, subsequently curbing monopolistic abuse practiced by some infrastructure 
industries. Therefore, the section to follow continues by looking at the development of 
economic regulation owing to an increase in private participation.  
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2.1.2 Economic Regulation  
Regulation is a key concern when dealing with infrastructure industries. Brown et al (2006:5) 
state that a regulatory system should be defined as “the combination of institutions, laws, and 
processes that, taken together, enable a government to exercise formal and informal control 
over the operations and investment decisions of enterprises that supply infrastructure 
services”. Thus, legislation and in some parts separate regulatory entities with some degree of 
autonomy (Brown et al. 2006) have been created in this regard. In most cases when carrying 
out their functions regulators are legally distinct and independent from both private and 
public influence (DBIS, 2011). However, regulators are expected to adhere to sector policies 
specified by government (Drew, 2004). This view confirms that a major part of regulation is 
to ensure the efficient use of infrastructure as well as the promotion of competition among 
different firms, thereby maximizing on the benefits. Nowotny (1998: 3) summarises the 
starting points of regulation: 
 Barriers of entry into markets. 
 Price regulation-regulation of tariff levels and structure which involves profit and cost 
control. 
 Setting of quality, standards and working rules that is, form of standards, minimum 
quality setting and mandatory tariff disclosure for the protection of the consumers.  
 Obligatory contracting, which are the conditions under which regulated enterprises 
are obliged to offer their services to everyone.  
 
However, the nature and extent of regulation as well as the scope and instruments of 
regulation are not fixed (Nowotny, 1998: 3) they also tend to differ across countries and their 
respective industries.  
On regulation governing access to infrastructure Lapuerta and Moselle (1999), on 
network industries in Europe, define two methods for access to infrastructure,  
(i) Regulated access and, 
(ii) Negotiated access  
Each as will be seen has its own terms and conditions with regards to access to a particular 
network.   
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Regulated access is seen as a scenario where the government sets the prices and 
terms through which potential new competitors can obtain access to essential networks 
Lapuerta and Moselle (1999). Such regulation is in line with arguments that are of the view 
that government plays a crucial role in enabling or hindering access; as it becomes that 
structure that dictates industry participants and the terms under which they access the 
infrastructure (PPAIF, 2012). An example of this is in Europe’s gas industry; the right of 
access to the system is based on published tariffs or other terms and obligations (Lapuerta 
and Moselle, 1999). One could confirm that, to an extent, regulated access with its published 
tariffs makes access easier as customers have a clear understanding of the terms and 
conditions in place and in this case discriminatory terms are normally at a minimal. However 
contrary to this, a point put forward by Swaminanthan and Houndete (2012), indicates that at 
times when governments are faced with monopolistic structures that do not want to surrender 
their monopoly status, they lack the bargaining power to implement regulation that allows for 
shared use or third party access.   
Negotiated access is a situation where “competitors negotiate the terms of access 
directly with the incumbents and negotiations must be non-discriminatory so as to ensure 
efficient outcomes” (Lapuerta and Moselle, 1999:455). The authors continue by saying that a 
major difference between the two is that in the former regulated access gives “eligible 
customers a right to access, on the basis of published tariffs for the use of transmission and 
distribution systems” and in the latter “producers and eligible customers are able to negotiate 
access to the system with each other on the basis of voluntary commercial agreements”. 
Negotiated access has been dominant in most parts of Europe and North America on the 
bases that it can incite sufficient competition and entry. However, in contrast, both the 
Australian Government (2013) andLapuerta and Moselle (1999), mention that in some 
instances negotiated access, given a vertically integrated network, an owner may deny 
competitors access to a network. Such misuse of power forecloses the market from 
competition, potentially denying the chances of shared use of infrastructure. This in essence 
highlights the shortfalls of negotiated access calling for a more inclusive and non-
discriminatory economic regulatory framework. In Europe before British Gas became a 
regulated entity, its operations were based on negotiated access, however the problem with 
this was that it often engaged in discriminatory practices that hindered fair access to other 
parties. It was such that British Gas was foreclosing the market by refusing access to its 
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network by other firms. These examples to a large extent expose some of the weaknesses of 
negotiated access in practice.  
In conclusion, one can confirm that during the 1980s the market system with its 
policies of full privatisation of infrastructure, driven by private sector firms was dominant, 
with little need for the state. However, with the envisaged results not being realised, the 
1990s onwards witnessed a new wave of socio-economic restructuring. Either the private 
sector was to become the owner or the government remained the sole owner. Furthermore, 
one can also confirm that the separation of ownership and operations within network 
industries led to ownership regimes that tend foreclose the market and restrict entry.  It then 
becomes of paramount importance to understand the regulatory governance “such as the laws 
and codes under which they operate, their processes and procedures, and so forth” (Stern 
(2007:5), which is what this paper set out to do.   
 
2.2 Developments in the Rail Sector     
This section examines developments in the rail sector owing to the de-regulation phase of the 
1990s.  Before privatisation the most common structure of the rail sector was the existence of 
a single state monopoly firm, in control of both infrastructure and rail services (Campos and 
Cantos, 2000). State owned firms were not free but regulated and viewed as inefficient partly 
because of the state’s inability to pull expenditures and new investments for infrastructure 
projects (Pittman, 2007). There was a call for deregulation, which saw countries begin to 
replace national railways with commercial bodies possessing independent and “realistic” 
balance sheets (Campos and Cantos, 2000:10). Van Der Mescht (2005) states that by 1997 
fourteen developing countries had transferred responsibility of most rail operations into 
private hands and that 44 rail networks in 16 countries had either been concessioned or 
privatized, with the notable experiences being in the European Union (Britain) and the United 
States of America. Campos and Cantos (2000:13) state, “deregulation brought about 
ownership structures that were separated along the lines of infrastructure and services”. Two 
structures are explored (i) Vertical integration and (ii) Vertical separation and given South 
Africa’s case a third structure is considered here, which is (iii) Corporatisation. One can 
confirm that the reasoning behind this was that such restructuring would boost the entry of 
several operators’ thus encouraging competition and increased efficiency of rail infrastructure 
in the movement of freight. 
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The restructuring process differed in each country depending on the objectives being 
pursued, either to stick to one operator or to increase competition on the tracks. Table 4 
below summarises deregulation in the rail sector and the resultant outcomes.  
 
Table 4: Railway De-regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s re-construction (WESTAC, 1997:5) 
Corporatisation, involves placing “selected publicly-owned enterprises into a 
position analogous to that of the private sector while retaining public ownership” 
(Department of Trade and Finance, 1998: 7), an example being South Africa’s Transnet, the 
state owned vertically integrated monopoly. In South Africa corporatisation as a reform 
mechanism was seen as a way of enhancing commercial performance (Eberhard, 2005). So 
the idea behind this was to make state enterprises adjust to the commercial and competitive 
environment that had been triggered by the market system, a somewhat alternative to full 
privatisation as reiterated by the NSW Treasury (1991). It also presented ground for the 
continuation of public ownership thus retaining the state’s economic and social obligations 
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(Department of Trade and Finance, 1998). A corporatised structure is based on the following; 
the government is the major shareholder and appoints directors with commercial expertise, 
the CEO is responsible to the Board of Directors and managers are often given the authority 
to make operational decisions (Department of Trade and Finance, 1998). Additionally, as a 
corporation, the government entity is also liable to pay company taxes and dividend payments 
(Eberhard, 2007). By extension some points worth noting about Government Corporations 
are as follows: 
 The management of government corporations entails both management of basic functions 
as well as decisions on investments and prices, as they are expected to become self-
financing (Klien, 2012).  
 In Australia, some corporatised entities have their own power to invest and borrow for 
their operations (Department of Trade and Finance, 1998) 
 By reallocating control rights to managers, this increases the potential to improve 
performance and increase efficiency (HERMES, 2008). 
 
The operations of a corporatised structure will become much clearer after a discussion of 
Transnet and its operations in chapter 3.   
Vertical integration is where a single public or private entity controls the 
infrastructure as well as the operating and administrative functions (Campos and Cantos, 
2000).  The justifications for a vertically integrated structure are well summarised below by 
WESTAC (1997:7) 
(i) Costs and efficiency 
An integrated railway must be innovative to make greater economic use of its infrastructure. 
This is only possible through the provision of creative service offerings that require the 
coordination of infrastructure and operations strengths. This competitive dynamic is absent if 
infrastructure is divorced from operations because track owners and transport service 
providers will pursue different objectives. 
(ii) Rates and service 
Distancing the infrastructure further from shippers is generally contrary to railways around 
the world that are pursuing closer ties with their customers. Therefore, customer service is 
likely to suffer under a separated model. 
(iii) Operations   
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The operational aspects and interface between services from the track and running of trains is 
too complex to separate (e.g., track design standards and maintenance strategies affect train 
speeds and axle-loads which in turn affect customer service parameters such as reliability, 
transit time, and safety; dispatching to multiple service providers would be less efficient).  
  Vertical separation is a structure whereby one entity owns the infrastructure and 
other competing entities provide transportation services (WESTAC, 1997). Vertical 
separation has been identified as the most ideal structure to adopt given its potential to 
harness competition (United Nations, 2003). One of the justifications for a vertically 
separated structure related to cost and efficiency is that, with the introduction of a number of 
new operators this promotes greater efficiency and lower costs for industries (WESTAC, 
1997:6). However, by way of contrast although shippers are presented with a varied choice of 
operators in this structure, a disadvantage cited by the Department for International 
Development (2004) is that separating infrastructure and operations can be a daunting task 
and it is sometimes better to carry out these activities jointly, like in the vertically integrated 
structure. Nonetheless, a difference worth noting echoed by WESTAC (1997) of the two 
structures is to do with the degree of Third Party Access to infrastructure. In a vertically 
integrated structure there is a low degree of third party access as operators tend to voluntarily 
grant access and in a vertically separated structure there is a high degree of third party access 
as it is mandated.    
Today most railways are vertically integrated, but Lapuerta and Moselle (1999) point 
out that instead of encouraging new entrants within a level playing field, in most cases 
vertically integrated systems, either state or private tend to foreclose the market from 
competitors. Campos and Cantos (2000) explain that this vertical separation has led to a loss 
in economies of scale. This point is also shared by Havenga (2011) who argues that vertical 
separation of rail networks has the potential to destroy the economies of scale of vertical 
integration through the imposition of higher costs. Pittman cited in Havenga (2011) states that 
although vertical separation works well in other network industries railways present a 
different case because of “high proportions of fixed costs, upstream economies of scale and 
the locus of vertical separation”.  Toledano (2012: 47), states that in Africa particularly in 
mining activities where mining companies have been “granted the vertically integrated 
concession of the railways, they have not been successful in achieving shared use even if the 
state has kept the ownership of the tracks”. 
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2.2.1 Rail regulation  
In some countries that have adopted the vertically separated structure, such as Australia there 
have been cases of discriminatory behaviour in terms of access to rail infrastructure, such as 
in the Pilabara iron ore region, were BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto control the railways and 
Ports, here third party access to rail has been unsuccessful due to monopolistic practices. So 
in order to regulate such conflict, Third Party Access is governed by Part IIIA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (TPA). It stipulates the means through which third parties can gain access 
to services (Feil, 2007). It is further stated that one of its objectives is to, “provide a 
framework and guiding principles to encourage a consistent approach to access regulation in 
each industry”. It is a regulatory framework for access negotiation supported by dispute 
resolution procedures and with this, today in Australia three different acts cover third party 
access to rail infrastructure (Feil, 2007). In Australia the Queensland Rail Network Access 
Undertaking (2010), states that the rail network has developed a framework to manage 
negotiations with access seekers for access to rail Infrastructure. It is mentioned that access 
seekers must provide as part of their access application all information necessary for the 
network provider to consider their application and the provider often has to respond with an 
indicative access proposal to an access seeker within 30 days. The indicative assessment 
indicates whether there is sufficient available capacity to accommodate the requested access 
rights and, if not, either an outline of the works, and an indicative estimate of the cost of such 
works, required to provide the additional capacity necessary to accommodate the requested 
access rights, or an outline of the requirements for an investigation into the provision of 
sufficient capacity for the requested access rights is provided (QR Networks Access 
Undertaking 2010). This basically sets the platform for negotiations to ensue. This summary 
is an epitome of Australia’s well established rail regulatory regime which up to date remains 
effective across most of its major states.  
In Canada when competition was introduced in the railway industry which is a typical 
example of a privately owned vertically integrated structure, it also set up economic 
regulations to facilitate industry access and operations under the Canadian Transportation Act 
(Alberta Transportation, 2003). However, under the Canadian structure access rights are not 
as readily available as those found in Australia and the United Kingdom, but regulation is 
there to address disputes when they do arise. In this regard Perl (2002) states Canada has 
what is termed passive regulation. However, setting favourable terms and conditions for 
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network industries still remains a serious challenge for a number of regulatory and 
competition authorities owing to the existence of monopolistic industries embedded in the 
different structures identified above.     
 
In conclusion, up to this point, “privatisation still remains controversial in terms of the 
degree and extent to which it should go and the pace and form it should take” Godana and 
Hlatshwayo (1998: 23), more so in network industries. Although privatisation was identified 
as being an immediate solution to the poor performance of public enterprises, the South 
African case is somewhat different. The de-regulation phase of the 1980s saw state owned 
entities such as Transnet, the rail operator, becoming more corporatized - away from the 
popular vertically separated and vertically integrated private structures. Therefore, the 
following chapter looks at South Africa’s regulatory regime as a result of these structural 
changes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Case study  
This chapter will focus on how the regulatory regime with respect to pricing, access rights 
and long term development provisions (investments) has affected the movement of freight at 
a sectorial level. A detailed analysis will also be given through a case study of coal miners 
and citrus growers in Mpumalanga. It gives a picture of the impact the regulatory regime has 
in terms of hindering or enabling shared use of railway infrastructure in South Africa.       
 
3.1  The South African Railway Network Regulatory Regime   
In South Africa there is no economic regulatory body that currently exists for rail freight 
services. Therefore in this regard the regulatory environment that oversees access in South 
Africa is looked at via the institutional arrangements that exist between all major 
stakeholders. Transnet is indirectly managed by the Department of Public Enterprise (DPE) 
and the Department of Transport (DoT). Drew (2004) states the DoT is responsibe for 
transport policy with minimal control over rail policy implementation as it does not 
administer the operations of Transnet. Under the DoT is the Railway Safety Regulator, which 
oversees railway safety in South Africa (PPAIF, 2012). On the contrary, the DPE is Transnets 
Freight Rails shareholder and quasi-regulator (Teljeur, 2003). This means that although the 
Department of Public Enterprise is the sole shareholder, the current institutional framework 
states that the shareholder cannot take the role of a regulator hence cannot question some of 
the business decissions and tariffs set by Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) as this would be in 
breach of corporate governance principles (Teljeur, 2003:43). This peculiar relationship has 
led to TFR having a certain degree of commercial autonomy in its decision making processes 
such as on pricing and access control. Overall the DPE has a more significant stake in the 
operations of Transnet as compared to DoT.  
Although not fully adopted, the privatisation process of the late 1980s had a significant 
bearing in the re-structuring of Transnet as a corporatised entity. It is important to note that 
even though South Africa did not fully or partially privatise its rail infrastructure services and 
operations, Transnet as a State Owned Company (SOC) means that; 
“Governments can establish and register a company using a formal company constitution drawn up 
according to corporate law,  the memorandum and articles of association” and an arms-length distance is 
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also maintained by “vesting all or part of the shareholding in another ministry such as Ministry of Public 
Enterprises because they are interested in the company’s commercial performance without line-ministry 
political accountability, therefore less likely to succumb to political pressure” (PPAIF, 2012:69).  
 
So, in essence rail infrastructure in South Africa despite being state owned, the services and 
operations have become more corporatised. Drew (2004: 27) goes on to add that; 
“Although it may be considered that Transnet, as a public company is free to determine its own 
commercial policy, it is, in view of its shareholding, subject to compliance with the governance 
requirements of the Legal Succession Act, PFMA and Treasury Regulations as well a Shareholder’s 
Compact between Transnet and the Minister”.  
 
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) is the accounting authority for public entities 
(National Treasury, 2002) and a shareholder compact is designed solely to regulate the 
relationship between the shareholder, on the one hand, and the Board and management of the 
SOE (Dwarf, 2012). So in this case, the shareholder compact is a negotiated arrangement 
with the SOE and Ministry of Public Enterprise that ensures the alignment of the SOE with 
government policy (Drew, 2004). Furthermore, Transnet’s mandate and strategic objectives 
of the company are set out in the shareholder compact (Transnet Report, 2010). The 
shareholder compact as depicted in table 5 is designed to enable the SOE to become more 
efficient and competitive by adhering to market principles and at the same time increasing 
their operational efficiency. In terms of the shareholder compact although the DPE is 
Transnets quasi regulator, the compact anchored by Transnets corprote plan (Presidential 
review committee, 2012), enables it to set orperational and financial targets for individual or 
combined business units as shown in table 5. Therefore in conclusion one can confirm that 
the shareholder compact is the only instrument that is there to monitor the performance of 
Transnet’s freight rail busness unit Transnet Freight Rail (TFR).  
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          Table 5: Transnet Shareholder Compact 2010 - 2011 
 
Source: Transnet 2011 
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3.1.1 Access Pricing  
Transnet is an enterprise with a commercial orientation and because railways have high fixed 
costs and operational costs one of the major objectives for an entity like this is to price 
services at a market competitive level greater than the variable costs of the service (PPAIF, 
2012). Historically, Transnet rail freight tariffs were set on an ad valorem basis, meaning that 
tariffs were set on the basis of cargo value and not on size, quantity or weight (Teljeur, 2003). 
Today because of its commercial autonomy TRF is responsible for setting the tarrif structure, 
tarrif level and for access pricing. Its pricing strategy is determined subject to “approval by 
Transnet’s Tariff and Marketing Committee and the Transnet board, which evaluates the 
tariffs in the context of the overall profitability of Transnet” (Teljeur, 2003:40) and another 
point made is that Transnet is not expected to submit these tariffs to the DPE for approval. 
TFR in its pricing strategy makes use of the Ramsey pricing strategy, used more often by 
vertically integrated railways (OECD/ITF, 2009), such as Transnet itself. Ramsey pricing, 
involves setting charges according to the elasticity of demand of each user (United Nations, 
2003) and the rate is normally the highest, as it is set at the level that the market will bear 
(PPAIF, 2012).  
Transnet charges different rates to different business of which these rates are 
negotiated between TFR and the shipper. Although, some shippers have some negotiating 
capital they ultimately have no choice of subsitutes and cannot take any tariff or price 
decision by TFR on review other than to lodge a complaint with Transnet itself as DPE can 
only exercise indirect and limited influence (Teljeur, 2003). This shows that access pricing 
can be a barrier to entry because if the price is set too high during negotiations the shipper 
may have to settle for the next best alternative, partly explaining why citrus has moved to 
road in Mpumalanga.  In summary, TFR sets access prices, through the application of 
different strategies and models meaning that all entrants at a sectorial level either coal miners 
or citrus growers would receive different tarrifs and price levels. The use of the Ramsey 
policy in which prices are not at a cost but at the highest level means that the system is open 
to abuse to hide inefficiences and this is worsend by the fact that the shareholder compacts do 
not address pricing issues, which in this regard denotes the weaknesses of the shareholder 
compact as an instrument for monitoring TFR.  So, a major challenge is that the regulatory 
regime does not know how TFR sets prices but to be accomodative freight costs need to be 
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set in such a way that they are low enough to retain customers in all sectors of economic 
activity, but high enough to retain revenues to sustain the infrastructure. 
 
3.1.2 Access rights  
In terms of access rights Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) controls access to its network. 
According to an interview with TFR management access to the network is negotiated on the 
following grounds: 
1. Access is granted on the number of slots available on the mainline and whether 
Transnet has the capacity to handle the demand, therefore shippers are required to 
submit their volume projections in advance for instance per annum, which would 
make it easier for Transnet to not only allocate a slot but to set appropriate tariffs and 
prices.  
2. Frequency or consistency of the volumes to be moved per day, week or month. 
3. The shippers intending to gain access or to get a slot on the TFR mainline/rail head 
need to have the appropriate infrastructure in place such as feeder lines, railway 
sidings and loading equipment to allow for a seamless process from point of 
collection to port.  
4. Based on the commodity characteristics of the commodity to be moved, is the 
appropriate equipment available to Transnet, such as wagons and containers. 
 
Teljeur (2003) states that price negotiations often benefit large or organised customers like 
mineral users who can influence the tariffs they face. On the other hand some customers have 
direct accounts and are served directly by TFR such as the big coal mining houses and some 
automotive industries. Customers without direct accounts with TFR, such as the citrus 
growers, tend to make use of transport brokers who have direct accounts with TFR. In this 
regard shippers seeking entry would not receive the same technical terms and conditions for 
access. For instance, volume projections for certain shippers would put them at a 
disadvantage at the negotiation table, especially those that run on seasonal projections like 
agricultural produce. This suggests that differences in traffic volumes play a significant role 
in influencing access decisions. Important to note from the interview is that subject to the 
negotiation process if there is no agreement reached on access rates/terms/fees with the 
25 
 
shipper, given TFR’s control the shipper has no choice but to seek an alternative mode.  
 
Transnet justifies this on the basis that it is expected to be self-financing meaning in most 
cases the highest margin customers will be allocated capacity first (Teljeur, 2003). Therefore, 
the degree of commercial autonomy Transnet Freight Rail has over most of its operations has 
given it leeway to foreclose the market for lower margin customers whose operations tend to 
be less profitable like citrus produce. 
 
3.1.3 Long term development provisions / Investment  
PPAIF (2012) states that, the fact that railways are capital intensive means that a high 
proportion of the cash flow should be spent on investment, so financial activities such as 
borrowing and raising capital from markets as Transnet does, allows it to invest more than its 
annual cash flow, thus ensuring expansion and operational efficiency. Insufficient 
investments in the long run have lead to a series of inefficiencies, as seen through the 
National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), where lack of investment overtime has left the 
network operating below capacity levels (Dube, 2012). Investment has to be an ongoing 
process. Therefore, long term development provisions would in this case focus on the 
investment decisions made by TRF and how some of these investment decisions affect rail 
use at a sectorial level. Investment levels in this case are paired according to how much TRF 
pumps into its different operations and business units. An analysis of physical factors (rolling 
stock) and an analysis of asset productivity (track productivity) is also warranted in this 
regard. Drawing from the section on access pricing, TFR has in the past relied on price 
increases to generate a sufficient cashflow for investment and one of the main aims of this 
has been to grow TFR’s General Freight Business (GFB). Table 6 shows capital investments 
made by Transnet from 2002 to 2010.  
Table 6: Transnet capital investment by division 2002-2010  
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Source: Rustomjee (2013)  
 
 Spoornet/Transnet Freight Rail (Rb) CoalLink General Freight 
2002  R131m Locomotives 
R110m wagons  
R93m General capacity expansion  
 
 
2003 5 year plan R30b 
Spoornet 5y R14b 
  
2005 5 year plan R40b Spoornet 5y - R16b 
R3.8.6b spent in 2005 Wagon fleet renewal 
and modernisation for General Freight 
R550m 
Ore line: capacity expansion (29 mt to 
41mt) R332m 
Coal line: capacity expansion (71 mt to 86 
mt) R256m 
Upgrade 200 additional class 18E 1 
locomotives for general freight R200m Ore 
line: sustain 05/06 to 09/10 R108m 
Building of 256 CCR11 jumbo coal 
wagons on the coal export line R71m 
R3.9b - 5 year plan 
 
CoalLink plan to increase 
capacity to 86mt by 2010 through 
take-or-pay agreements with coal 
industry 
 
• Replating of coal line jumbo 
wagons  
• Upgrade of 11E locomotives 
 
9.0b - 5 year plan 
 
General freight to 160mt by 2010 
 
Eskom/Spoornet plan 67km 9mt/a 
dedicated Ermelo-Majuba line 
 
Spoornet/Auto industry plan 
increase of vehicle exports - 
Durban harbour 
 
Scheduled Durban-City Deep 
container train service (5 container 
trains/day) introduced 
 
 Total R1 517m    
2006  5y plan R64.5b Spoornet R31.5b 
R7.2b spent 2006  
Centralization of capital projects above 
R300m 
Consolidation of all major maintenance and 
maintenance responsibility with Transwerk 
 
7.9b 5 year plan 
 
110 new locomotives 
400 jumbo wagons 
Wagon fleet renewal 
Upgrade 200 Class 18E1 
locomotives 
 
 
R10.8b 5 year plan Majuba coal 
supply line 
 
2007 5y plan R64.5b Spoornet 5y R31.5b 
R7.4b spent 2007 
 
50 refurbished diesel 
locomotives. 
 
Target capacity to 78mt per 
annum (previously 72mt per 
annum) to 82 mt per annum 
during 2008, once the Jumbo coal 
wagons currently on order from 
Rail Engineering and the first new 
heavy haul locomotives on order 
from Mitsui are received. This 
will be incrementally improved in 
line with coal demand up to 92mt 
by 2012, based on long-term take-
or-pay contracts with coal miners. 
 
Plan procurement of 212 diesel 
locomotives 
 
2008  Spoornet 5y R34.8b R4.9b 5 year plan 
 
R24.6b 5 year plan 
 
2009 R9.7b targeted capex for 2009 
R2.8b wagons R3.3b locomotives R2.2b 
infrastructure 
Higher allocation for expansion vs previous 
years focus on heavy maintenance 
R1.6b actual R8.8b 5 year plan 
 
R5.4b actual R25.6b 5 year plan 
 
2010  Coal line – first 6 of 110 Class 
19E locomotives delivered. 592 
wagons delivered. 
 
Container-on-rail performance 
indicator. Market share grew from 
27% to 31% of market share of rail 
containers expressed as a 
percentage of railable maritime 
import and export containers. 
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In an interview with TFR and through analysis of figures from Rustomjee (2013), it is seen 
that major investments are channelled towards those profitable commodity groups such as 
coal, iron ore and manganese as well as profitable lines such as Natcor and CoalLink. 
However, overall most of Transnets capital investments have focused on sustaining rather 
than expansion (Transnet 2012). Investments are targeted towards existing capacity which 
serves existing customers whilst new investments that could serve other customers are 
disregarded. Such selective investments leave some commodities underserved by TFR which 
shows the outcomes some of the investment decisions have on the use of rail at a sectorial 
level.  
A look into Transnets Report (2013), shows that a lot of capital investments by Transnet 
compared to other operating divisons such as Transnet National Ports Authority and Transnet 
Pipielines, a big chunk of it has in the past been channeled to TFR with figures reaching 
R18.3 billion in 2013 up from R8.6 billion in 2009, the investment target is a display of 
needing to rescue the business from collapse. A further look into TFR investment decisions 
based on this report (2013:52-55) shows investment figures for its three business segments;  
 Total investment for Export coal R3 303 million  
 Total investment for Iron export ore 2 011 million   
 Total investment for General Freight R13.0 billion  
The huge investment into some of these business segments such as export coal and iron ore 
could be paired to the amount of revenue they generate for TFR and the need to sustain and 
expand them given their dedicated well cordinated structures. Although General Freight 
receives a lot of investment, one needs to take into account that given the different 
commodities that fall under this segment, coordinating the movement of freight in this regard 
has proved to be a challenge for TFR compared to the well run export coal and iron ore lines. 
In the General Freight Business, which citrus falls under, it can be noted that although TFR 
has been investing regularly there continues to be operational inefficiencies in both rolling 
stock and track productivity which has left freight rail less attractive for most agricultural 
shippers (Brooke, 2011). In essence, for the GFB there still remain huge deficiencies despite 
the massive injections of capital investments and although it comprises of a range of 
commodities, table 6 suggests that investments have been targeted to a limited set of general 
freight such as manganese and automotive. 
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Table 7 below provides a summary of some of the key points raised which help frame an 
understanding of the regulatory regime.  
Table 7: Tabulated Summary of the South African Rail Regulatory Regime  
Decision Regulatory Agency Ministry 
(Department of 
Public 
Enterprises) 
Company/enterprise 
(Transnet – Transnet 
Freight Rail ) 
Tariff structure X   
Tariff level X   
Service quality X   
Consumer complaints X   
Sector expansion plans X   
Investment plans/decisions X   
Technical and safety 
standards 
   
Anti-competitive behavior    
Source: Authors own re-construction 2014  
In conclusion, this section has managed to give an account of the regulatory regime in terms 
of access pricing, access rights and long term development provisions and how it relates to 
overall access to rail infrastructure in South Africa. Access is granted by the state monopoly 
through a negotition process and investments, as shown, appear to bias coal, manganese and 
the automotive sector. Although TFR is monitored through the shareholder compact, it is 
more concerned with operational efficiency and profit and less on discriminatory practices 
such as access pricing and access rights.  
 
3.2 Rail Operations in South Africa: Outcomes of the Regulatory Regime 
on the movement of Coal and Citrus  
Transnet is the biggest freight Rail Company in Southern Africa. Locally Transnet TFR is 
responsible for the transportation of rail in South Africa and owns and maintains a network of 
22 000 kilometres (Transnet, 2013). The development and maintenance of rail continues to 
provide a cheap transportation option for the movement of freight. 
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Map 1: Transnet’s Reach 
 
 Port and Terminals  
      Pipelines  
                   ---- Rail 
 
Source: Transnet Annual Report 2010 
The fact that Transnet is run as a State Owned Company, at arms length of government, puts 
it in a compromising position because while attempting to respond to market demands it has 
to maintain principles that are in line with public sector objectives. Through this Transnet 
tends to hold social and economic development hostage to market forces (Von Holdt 2003). 
This is because given the post deregulation phase of the transport industry initiated in the 
1990s, TFR as a corporatised entity changed their strategy to focusing more on those routes 
that were profitable (CGA, 2010), namely their heavy haul export lines that move coal and 
iron ore. Referring to the table which identifies the key corridors and commodities it is 
interesting to note that citrus production does not seem to be a part of this. So, despite rail 
Corridor Primary Commodities Transported 
1 Sishen to Saldanha   Export iron ore  
2 Capecor  General freight  
3 Southcor  Automotives, managanese and general feight  
4 Natcor  General freight such as steel, domestic coal, 
containers, liquid bulk, refined synthetics, 
crude, avtur and gas 
5 R.Baycor  Export coal, magnetite and chrome  
6 Maputo Corridor  Gerneral freight  
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networks’ existing in most major areas of production credence is being given to the profitable 
lines and corridors, which has left those sectors that do not fall into TFR’s “profitable 
bracket”, such as citrus growers at a disadvantage.  
 
3.2.1 Mpumalanga  
The size of TFR’s Rails network in Mpumalanga is 2,233 kilometers and the rail system in 
the province is said to generate the greatest volume of traffic of any province in South Africa 
(Dpwrt, 2014). Traffic routed includes coal, chrome and ferrochrome ores, iron ore, 
containers and automotive products, forestry products, chemicals and liquids and various 
agricultural produce (Dpwrt, 2014). The movement of coal falls under the Coal Business Unit 
and citrus under the Container and Automotive Business unit (CAB) of TFR (Transnet, 
2013). Consequently, as we continue to see a growth in both the mining and agricultural 
sector, the demand for cheap, sustainable, consistent and reliable transport options to move 
freight in this region such as rail continues to grow. Therefore the ultimate challenge rests on 
rail networks being able to organize themselves in such a way that they meet the needs of the 
extractive industries and that of the agricultural sector as efficiently as possible, Collier 
(2011). 
From a commercial point of view, both agriculture and mining are dependent on 
railways because rail is highly operationally efficient based on the carrying capacity of 
wagons and rail tends to be most competitive when it offers better prices and services to its 
clients (PAIF, 2012). However, it is argued that rail transport has the habit of restricting itself 
to a relatively small number of industries and commodities, like large scale, bulky goods 
often supplied by some mineral and certain non-mineral sectors (DBSA, 2012). The reason 
behind this has been attributed to the differences in profitability margins, as agriculture has 
often been associated with a lower value rendering its need for rail inferior to that of mining 
(Collier, 2011). Through this it then becomes of interest to look at how inputs such as 
transport networks are bound together towards the functioning of the different strategic and 
non-strategic sectors of the economy through a real life case. 
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3.2.2 Coal 
Map 2: Rail Lines running through Mpumalanga’s Coal Fields 
 
Source: Dpwrt 2010 
 
The Mining sector is the second largest contributor to the Mpumalanga economy with most 
mining activity largely situated in the Highveld area of Ermelo and eMalahleni. Mpumalanga 
accounts for 83% of South Africa’s coal production and South Africa has in the past relied on 
coal to generate much of its export revenues (Dpwrt, 2010). The railways from the mines to 
the ports are controlled by the state owned monopoly Transnet. It owns and operates a 
dedicated coal track from eMalahleni to the sea, a distance of 580km and about 24 trains can 
use the system per day (Transnet, 2013). The local distribution channel sees coal from the 
eMalahleni coalfields being transported by rail through the coalex line to the Richards Bay 
Coal Terminal (RBCT) for export, which is privately owned by the largest mining groups 
(Transnet, 2013). The RBCT with a capacity of about 70 million tons per annum is said to be 
one of the biggest customers for rail in Mpumalanga as it accounts for 50% of gross tonnage 
moved by rail (Nel et al, 2004). It is further stated that this coal line to Richards Bay 
generates half the total revenue of TRF (Eberhard, 2011). Local coal use is mostly demanded 
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by Eskom, the state-owned power company and by Sasol the large sythetic fuels company. 
Over 90% of South Africa’s coal consumption is used for electricty generation and almost 
80% of saleable coal production is from mines controlled by five of the country’s largest 
mining groups (Eberhard, 2011); BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa, Anglo American 
Coal, Sasol, Exxaro Resources and Xstrata. 
Historically dating back to the 1970s, the activities of these mining groups were 
hugely supported by railway infrastructure through state investment and the Transvaal Coal 
Owners Association (Eberhard, 2011). These mining activities have been analysed through 
broader debates that focus on the Minerals Energy Complex.  McDonald (2011) states that 
“at the heart of the Minerals-Energy Complex is mineral extraction and processing”, which is 
heavily centred on capital accumulation, in the form of financial and speculative capital 
activities, which often do not have developmental linkages with rest of the sectors that drive 
sustained growth (SIMS report, 2012). Of importance in this regard is that railways have 
facilitated in this form of capital accumulation through their linkages with the mining sector. 
Although this research does not focus on the links between railways and the MEC, one can 
confirm that the regulatory regimes historic patterns of investment in this sector has meant 
that mines to-date have the appropriate infrastructure in place (railway sidings, feeder lines 
and loading equipement) and have an advantage in proximity to Transnets mainline, as seen 
through a site visit of the eMalahleni coalfields. It was seen that it is easier for the 
coordination of rail activities especially for coal in this region. Furthermore, investments in 
the coal line were hugely facilitated through a 10 year contract between the rail operator 
Transnet and coal shippers which came to an end in 2005, since then tariffs have been set 
through a negotiation process which some coal exporters argue are set too high (Eberhard, 
2011) but they still have leverage given the volume densities they generate compared to other 
sectors like citrus. An interview revealed that prices between TFR and the coal miners are 
negotiated and one advantage they have is the fact that most of the major coal miners have 
existing key accounts with TFR.  
 So the argument here is that the current regulatory regime would in this case favor 
the existing users of the infrastructure that have always been prioritized rather than new 
users. So dispite past disputes of TFR under-investing in rail capacity (Eberhard, 2011) an 
interview with some mining companies revealed that this has not detered most of them from 
changing their mode as rail still remains as the best modal choice given the dedicated coal 
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lines and their access to the main ports, and TFRs commitments over the past years to pump 
in more investments into this business unit, as shown in the shareholder compact and capital 
investment table in the previous section. The desire to investment more in coal, one can argue 
is driven by the sales, revenues and profits generated from this sector as shown in figure 1.  
 
            Figure 1: Annual SA Coal production, Sales & Exports 2003 – 2012 
 
Source: Chamber of Mines of South Africa 2012 
In 2012 it is approximated that 71% of production was sold locally at a value of R43.9 
Billion and 29% was exported at a value of R52.2 Billion (Chamber of Mines, 2013). In 
terms of revenue generation for TFR as depicted in Figure 2, in 2012 GFB made up 56.6% of 
TFR’s revenue compared to 12.4% from Export coal. However, although GFB generates the 
“lion’s” share of TFR’s revenue coal operations are well cordinated and better served by TFR 
compared to GFB. However it can be argued that for a single commodity coal exports rival 
iron ore exports as the biggest contributer to Transnets revenues. 
Figure 2: GFB and Export Coal Contribution to TFR Revenue 2012 – 2013           
Source: Transnet Report 2013 
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In conclusion, the fact that Transnet has been focusing its attention on particular routes sheds 
light into what Marsay (2005) mentions, in that rail needs to focus on those sectors for which 
it has an economic advantage such as mining, reason being in one way or another mining 
related processes require the use of railway infrastructure to transport break bulk such as coal 
and iron ore. However, following such a comparative advantage strategy may lead to 
elements of bias in that, sectors that increase freight traffic will be favored over those that do 
not. Although this makes economic sense for the financial stability of the rail networks it 
would not promote multi-sectorial growth, partly explaining the lag in agriculture based on 
the revenues generated vis-à-vis mining. It becomes a trade-off between serving business at 
the expense of promoting sustained sectorial growth within the economy.  
 
3.2.3 Citrus  
Apart from mining, agriculture is one of the main production driven sectors in South Africa. 
According to the South Africa year book 2012/13 (2012), the primary agricultural sector 
contributes about 3% to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) behind mining which 
recorded a 4.9% contribution to GDP in 2013. The agriculture sector is not only self-
sufficient in virtually all major agricultural products, such as citrus in this case but is also a 
net food exporter, highlighting the importance of this sector in the economy.  
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Map 3: Citrus Production Areas in South Africa including Rail Hubs and Ports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Source: CGA Stats Book 2012 
 
 
Table 8: Farms Consulted - Mpumalanga Citrus Growers: Ehlanzeni District 
 
Name of Farm Area Located Ha Exporting Yes/No: 
Cairn Lemon Oil  Nelspruit  15ha NO 
Setama Impelo  Nelspruit  15ha NO 
Sibonelo  Eilandshoek  15ha YES 
Thekwane Farm  Thekwane  170ha YES 
Champagne  Bushbuckridge  200ha NO 
Ryton Estates  Ngodwana  500ha YES 
Source: Authors re-construction 
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Mpumalanga province a major producer of citrus fruit for both domestic and export markets  
until recent years used to rely heavily on rail, as railed fruit was easily directed into any major 
fruit ports and citrus break-bulk terminals in South Africa, all of which are directly linked to 
the rail network (Brooke, 2010).  The farms denoted in table 8 do not depict the total number 
of citrus farms in the province; these are the ones the research restricted itself to. There are 
more than 1000 citrus growers in the Western and Eastern Cape and in the Northern Region 
which covers Mpumalanga, Zimbabwe and Swaziland. Mpumalanga accounts for 21% of 
South Africa’s citrus production and a third of its export volumes (CGA, 2012). South Africa 
is ranked third in the world for fresh citrus exports and the citrus variety includes Valencia, 
navels, grapefruits, soft citrus, lemons, Midseasons and Pummelos (CGA, 2012).  
Firstly, access issues can be attributed to the fact that, in terms of tariffs and pricing 
despite rail being associated with lower transport costs, research has shown that since 2009, 
there has been a drastic decrease in the use of rail by citrus growers owing to among others 
variations in pricing and transport rates (Brooke, 2010). The general argument is that the cost 
of rail is higher than road for the citrus growers (Brooke, 2010) taking into account the fact 
that some citrus farms are not directly connected to rail heads, thus an alternative transport 
mode has to be used to gain access to rail networks, however, such long logistical chains tend 
to increases transport costs for this sector. In a report by the CGA (Brooke, 2011) explained 
that “rising transport costs and logistical constraints are impacting heavily on the profitability 
and sustainability of citrus production in the region”. In an interview with Mitchell Brooke 
the logistics Manager for the CGA, it was revealed that logistics costs for the Northern region 
amount to 60% of revenue and about 25% of these costs are land freight logistics. Stander 
and Pienaar (2005) explains that in the early days the South African Railways now Transnet 
although built on and driven by business principles, mining and agricultural products had 
different and cheaper tariff structures as agricultural products were subsidized. However, one 
can then confirm that the loss in government subsidies paid to the rail industry for agriculture 
after deregulation in the late 1980s has had adverse effects for sectors such as citrus and 
further affected Transnet’s ability to offer a reliable and efficient service to these particular 
agricultural sectors.  
Access has also been partly hampered by the fact that in some cases where railway 
infrastructure is easily accessible the disadvantage has been on the terms governing access. 
For instance in South Africa in those citrus regions that are considered rail viable, because 
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citrus growers do not have direct rail accounts with TFR, the link between the growers and 
TFR is done through transport brokers who tend to increase the amount citrus growers have 
to pay to get their produce transported (Brooke, 2011). This third party commission charged 
by these transport brokers at the end of the day makes the cost of rail seemingly higher than 
road, making the prices uncompetitive as denoted in table 9. This has partly contributed to the 
move away from rail to road transportation for the growers. In this regard a key account 
offered directly to the citrus growers would help cut costs but this to has never materialised 
to-date. This could be partly blamed on the lack of tactical and operational planning from the 
citrus growers as a group as reiterated by (Crickmay, 2010). 
 
Table 9: Break-bulk Rail Cost vs Road to Durban Port 2010 
Source: CGA 2010 
 
Secondly, in terms of investment although in an attempt to carry out its public obligations 
TRF has in the past pledged to invest capital that would see the increased use of rail by the 
fruit industry there has been no long-term commitment towards this. Instead there have been 
huge investments in coal, particularly on infrastructure upgrades and increase in rolling stock. 
Therefore, owing to poor investments there remains an under utilization of rail infrastructure 
by the citrus growers. Based on interviews the argument is that TFR has remained committed 
to servicing commodities like coal and iron ore, deeming citrus not rail friendly due to its 
seasonality and inability to fill up wagons on a regular basis compared to coal. This has partly 
resulted in a deteriorating relationship between the rail service provider TFR and the citrus 
growers. An interview with the CGA further revealed that there has been no focus by 
Transnet to invest in citrus thus explaining why citrus in Mpumalanga has seized from 
moving on rail. Some of the farmers interviewed could attest to this, because despite some of 
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them being close to a rail head there has been no developments to ensue access to the main 
lines.  
Therefore, for most of them there is little hope of rail becoming part of their long-term 
transportation goals if they continue to face secondary treatment from the current regulatory 
regime. As a result most citrus growers as mentioned have since been routing their 
commodities by road. While there have been arguments that point to citrus not generating 
enough volumes to demand rail use, from an economic stand point Hausmann and Rodriguez 
(cited in Di John, 2011) argue that a country’s inability to develop an alternative export 
industry such as citrus which has a lot of potential could trigger the Dutch disease.  Which is 
“the adverse development implications, typically on manufacturing as well as agriculture, 
associated with a booming minerals sector” (Jourdan, nd: 4). Therefore more investments are 
needed to boost this particular sectors supply chain.  
Interviews with some of the citrus farmers revealed that physical factors such as 
dilapidated, outdated infrastructure and the limited railway infrastructure at ports have been 
working against them. It is reported that there has been a significant drop on both forestry and 
citrus traffic owing to capacity contraints and tariff increases by TFR, pushing a huge amount 
of freight volumes on to road transport (Dpwrt, 2013). For instance, there remains a serious 
demand for reefer containers as they have been identified as more efficient in the movement 
of citrus and there has been a limited number of packhouses accessible to rail (CGA, 2011).  
In 2010 it was reported that some citrus wagons remained undelivered to the Durban port for 
upto 12 days and out of 10 citrus receiving points only 3 could effectively receive rail (CGA, 
2011).  Furthermore, the increased volume of citrus being transported through road 
transportation is putting a strain on some of South Africa’s major roads as they are built for 
specific axle loads (Ndlovu, 2013). With all these events working against citrus, this has been 
worsened by the fact that  some citrus traffic from Limpopo has since been transferred to the 
Natcor line away from the Swaziland line, to make way for coal trains (CGA,2012),  as a 
result currently about 350 trucks transport citrus to Durban per day.  
Although talks have ensued between the Container and Automibile Business unit in 
which citrus falls under and with other various stakeholders in the Limpopo region such as 
the MEC for Roads and Transport and the Department of Economic Development, to address 
some of the challenges faced by citrus growers, there remains little progress in this regard for 
the past 5 years (Brooke, 2012). However the MEC for Roads and Transport and the 
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Department of Economic Development do not have a direct bearing on Transnets operations, 
therefore engaging the DPE in this case would be more ideal given its mandate discussed in 
section 3.1.   
To this point some critical reflections that can be made about the outcomes of the 
regulatory regime can be summarised as follows; 
 Due to the absence of competition for the state monopoly, the substantial efficiency 
gains experienced after corporatization have not benefited smaller consumers like 
citrus growers and that the principal beneficiaries have been the large consumers with 
lobbying and bargaining power like the huge mining companies who control the 
RBCT. 
 The regulatory regime in terms of access pricing, access rights, long term 
development provisions and the process of regulatory decision making tends to favour 
coal, citing this as a result of the volume projections, profitability rates and revenue 
genertated from this business unit compared to citrus whose figures are hard to 
quantify under the General Freight Business. Therefore because coal has the volumes 
citrus is being foreclosed. 
 On pricing Transnet Freight Rail does not provide a service directly to citrus growers 
compared to coal miners, so the negotiation process for citrus growers involves a 
Third party resulting in inflated logistical costs.  
 The loss in government subsidies paid to the rail industry for agriculture after 
deregulation has shifted the balance towards road transport, as is the case for citrus in 
Mpumalanga.  
 The regulatory regimes historic patterns of investment, mean that mines have the 
appropriate infrastructure in place which makes it easier for the coordination of rail 
activities as opposed to citrus farms that require such investment given their 
geographical dispersion, in this case the regulatory regime tends to prioritize on the 
existing users who already have the support mechanisms in place, such as those seen 
at the eMalahleni coalfields. 
In conclusion to chapter 3, one can confirm that an economically unfreindly relationship 
between rail service providers and the different sectorial users (in this case citrus), as dictated 
by the regulatory regime does have potential to cause bias in terms of rail usage, more so in 
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terms of hindering the shared-use of rail infrastructure between the so called strategic and 
non-strategic sectors of the economy. As discussed, the South African regulatory regime 
which is in control of access tends to give priority to those sectors that help full-fill its 
business objectives of increasing its revenue and profit margins to sustain its balance sheet. 
The coal sector in this region has been a major beneficiary through the necessary 
infrastructural and investment backing compared to citrus. The movement of citrus by rail in 
this region has since stopped attributed to problems in pricing, access rights and investment 
decisions set by TFR as highlighted, thus most citrus growers in Mpumalanga have opted for 
road transportation. However, it is important to indicate that the cost advantage of efficient 
well run-rail transport can boost competitiveness among shippers in both coal and citrus 
production, but the regulatory regime needs to be committed to such an initiative to trigger 
such beneficial outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Summary and Conclusion 
4.1 Summary  
In summary, the ability to access railway infrastructure has a significant bearing on the 
movement of freight for most sectors of production that make use of rail, particularly where 
there is mixed use of mineral and non-minerals that demand similar rail lines. This thesis 
explained this social phenomenon by exploring the regulatory regime governing access to rail 
infrastructure in South Africa, through a case analysis of the shared-use of rail infrastructure 
between coal miners and citrus growers in the Mpumalanga province.  
Firstly, one of the objectives was to assess and explain the apparent bias that exists in 
the usage of rail infrastructure between mineral and non-mineral users, more specifically 
between coal and citrus growers. One important finding indicates that, ownership structure, 
either state or private, essentially sets in motion the regulatory terms that often govern rail 
access. For instance, the different ownership structures born out of the deregulation phase for 
rail, namely the private vertically integrated and vertically separated structures, tended to 
dictate the usage of infrastructure through monopolistic practices, thereby foreclosing the 
market from competition. Hence there was a call for economic regulation to monitor and 
establish rules of access and usage, as in the case of Canada and Australia. 
Secondly, the South African rail corporatised structure was considered in this paper to 
ascertain the extent to which the regulatory regime in charge of access enabled or hindered 
the shared use of rail infrastructure. With the absence of an economic regulator and a large 
degree of commercial autonomy the operations of Transnet, the vertically integrated state 
monopoly which controls access to its infrastructure were explored. The current regulatory 
regime through the auspices of the shareholder compact does not regulate price and access. It 
stipulates targets for investments but it is difficult to tell which commodities are being 
targeted. This has allowed for a vaccum in which interests that have always benefited and are 
seen as more profitable benefit at the disadvantage of others such as citrus. 
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Finally, it was also seen that the regulatory regimes historical patterns of investment in 
mining in South Africa have enabled this sector to have an added advantage, in that coal 
miners have always had the appropriate infrastructure in place which has made it easier for 
the coordination of rail activities as opposed to some citrus farms.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion the paper has managed to show that there is indeed an apparent bias that exists 
in the shared use of railway infrastructure between coal miners and citrus growers. The 
theoretical framework of the regulatory school was used to explore this bias. Through an 
analysis of the regulatory regime, the paper managed to confirm that the mining sector does 
not encounter as much barriers to the use of rail infrastructure in comparison to non-mineral 
users. This study indicates that the factors that hinder the shared use of rail infrastructure 
between the agricultural and mining sector in South Africa is centred on the failures of the 
institutions and methods of administering economic regulation in light of corporate 
fundamentalism. However, despite the bias that exists, both coal miners and citrus growers 
still demand rail infrastructure to facilitate growth potentials and operational efficiency. The 
regulatory regime in charge of access needs to create an enabling environment for this to 
occur.  
Way forward  
There is a possible need for government/DPE to make serious governance reforms with 
regards to the operations of TFR and its relationship with the different sectors, such as 
transparency of decision-making by the entities making regulatory decisions or set up an 
independent economic regulator.  
This paper suggests that Transnet (TFR) needs to review its regulatory substance, which is 
the content of its regulation (Brown et al. 2006), such as: 
 Tariff levels  
 Tariff structures  
 Quality of service standards  
 Investment or connection obligations and reviews, and  
 Network access conditions for new and existing customers  
To ensure that its operations are non-discriminatory for participants who require access to rail 
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infrastructure in the movement of their goods.  
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Appendix 
INTERVIEW WORKSHEET – CITRUS GROWERS 
Contact Name  
Title:        Telephone Number: 
Firm:  
Location: 
Interview Date:      Time:  
 
Choice Factor  Question/s to be asked  
Physical Attributes of Goods  
 Shipment size? 
 Shipment package characteristics? 
 Shipment self-life? 
 Shipment value? 
Flow of Shipment  
 What is your shipment frequency? 
 What is the average shipment distance? 
Mode Used  
 Which modes (mode) are used for freight transportation? 
 What is the international best practice?  
 
Mode Decision  
 How do you decide on transportation mode?  
 What shipment characteristics do you consider most important: price,  reliability or speed?  
 Have you used rail in the past?  
 Have you been satisfied/ dissatisfied and why?  
 Is rail frequency a problem?  
 Do you have contracts with trucking companies? If so, was rail considered  before entering 
into such contracts?  
 Is rail an option?  
Accessibility/ Location  
 Is rail an option?  
 Are you near a railhead?  
 Would you consider using truck to get to rail?  
 Was rail accessibility considered when deciding on a location? Was highway proximity 
considered when deciding on a location?  
 If rail were accessible, would you consider using it? 
 If rail is not accessible, are you satisfied with this? Would you consider using it?  
 Are you looking to build rail connections to make it accessible?  
 Do Mpumalanga citrus growers generate sufficient volumes of cargo to demand the use of 
rail transport? 
 Is rail part of your company’s long-term transportation goals? 
 What would rail have to do to become part of your future goals (e.g. increase reliability, 
increase shipment frequency etc.)?  
 How many cold stores are there in Mpumalanga and how many are rail capable? 
 How many hubs are in Mpumalanga? And are located close to the main line and how 
accessible are they to the farmers in the region? 
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 Has there been a slow response by Transnet to meet some of the demands of the citrus 
growers? 
Shared Use of Rail 
 Does coal traffic affect the transportation of citrus? 
 Does the fact that farmers are dispersed present too many logistical problems which tends to work 
against them in terms of access to rail? 
 What infrastructure do citrus producers have in place that facilitates access to the main railway 
lines? 
 Does citrus production receive a lot of investment, which could facilitate in the building of rail 
infrastructure that connects to the main lines? 
 In conclusion, would you say there is a bias with regards to shared use of rail infrastructure in 
South Africa more specifically between the agriculture and the mining sectors? 
Future Plans  
 Are you looking to build rail connections to make it accessible? 
 Is rail part of your company’s long-term transportation goals? 
 What would rail have to do to become part of your future goals (e.g. increase reliability, 
increase shipment frequency etc)?  
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INTERVIEW WORKSHEET – MITCHELL BROOKE 
Contact Name  
Title:        Telephone Number: 
Firm:  
Location: 
Interview Date:      Time:  
 
QUESTIONS FOR THE CITRUS GROWERS ASSOCIATION: LOGISTICS 
 Are the current arrangements between Transnet and coal producers conducive enough for the 
transportation of this commodity by rail in terms of (Policy, Price, Capacity, Infrastructure) 
 
 In the industrial and logistics oriented market, freight transport clients prefer high quality of 
service (transport cost is not as important) and road transport service quality is regarded as 
being superior to that of rail transport. How far true is this within the citrus sector? 
 What infrastructure do citrus producers have in place that facilitates access to the main 
railway lines? 
 
 What are the procedures in acquiring a rail account and can the issue around transport 
brokering be avoided so as to reduce rail costs? 
 Has the CGA been successful in managing a rail account on behalf of the growers? 
 
 Do Mpumalanga citrus growers generate sufficient volumes of cargo to demand the use of 
rail transport? 
 
 How successful have citrus growers been in re-establishing the use of break-bulk rail 
transportation? 
 
 Does the fact that farmers are dispersed present too many logistical problems which tends to 
work against them in terms of access to rail.  
 
 Does coal traffic affect the transportation of citrus? 
 
 Does citrus production receive a lot of investment, which could facilitate in the building of 
rail infrastructure that connects to the main lines? 
 
 In conclusion, would you say there is a bias with regards to shared use of rail infrastructure in 
South Africa more specifically between the agriculture and the mining sectors? 
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INTERVIEW WORKSHEET – TRANSNET 
Contact Name  
Title:        Telephone Number: 
Firm:  
Location: 
Interview Date:      Time:  
 
Regulation on Access 
 
 
 Which one of the following models describes the rail sector in your country? 
 Where does Transnet derive its authority to carry out its economic regulation from, 
Constitution, law or statute, Government decree, contract or Combination of the above?  
 In terms of regulation to access rail, which one does Transnet make use off: Regulated 
Access or Negotiated Access?  
 Does the regulation require that all entrants receive the same technical terms and conditions 
for access?  
 Does the regulation require that all entrants receive the same prices for access? 
 Are they any groups of customers who access rail at a very low price? 
 If operators cannot agree on access rates/terms/fees who can intervene to resolve conflicts?  
 Is there a legally defined process for appealing unfair economic regulatory decisions for 
customers?  
 
 
Decision Regulatory Agency Ministry Company/enterprise 
(identify which 
company/enterprise) 
Tariff structure    
Tariff level    
Service quality    
Consumer complaints    
Sector expansion plans    
Investment 
plans/decisions 
   
Technical and safety 
standards 
   
Anti-competitive 
behaviour 
   
 
The Transnet Freight Rail divisional team managing the citrus sector is the 
Container and Automotive Business (CAB) 
 
 Has there been any attempt by Transnet to improve its services or tailor make certain 
facilities to accommodate or promote a shift back to rail transport for citrus farmers? 
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 Citrus produce has strict arrival and departure times, thus has rail transport been able to meet 
these demands? 
 What are the procedures in getting a rail account and can the issue around transport brokering 
be avoided so as to reduce rail costs for citrus growers? 
 What are the rents earned by citrus and coal producers and how do they affect Transnet’s 
financial position? 
 Do the differences in traffic volumes or consistency of freight carried influence how each 
sector is treated on a business level? 
 Can one say, because mining is the largest industry in the primary sector this would make up 
for its dominance in the rail sector? 
 How much competition exists for the use of rail infrastructure in South Africa? 
 Railway infrastructure networks’ financial sustainability depends critically on high traffic 
volumes which sector provides the most volume and can this sector alone sustain Transnet or 
that particular business unit? 
 Are all freight railway networks in South Africa multi-product? 
 How many major railway lines run through Mpumalanga are they mostly single-track or 
double track lines? 
 Do the railway service levels and quality in South Africa respond to the market demands of 
both mineral and agricultural sector? 
 How much investment goes into citrus production both private and public compared to 
investments that goes into mining, could we say this has an influence on access to 
infrastructure such as rail? 
 What competitive advantage is offered by rail (Transnet) to the citrus producers or coal 
producers?  
 It is sometimes mentioned that governments that own shares in mining operations, oil 
production and refining, steelworks, or similar industries sometimes pressure rail freight 
managers to keep tariffs artificially low to support so-called ‘strategic’ industries. What is 
your take on this?  
 Can shared use impair/affect operating efficiency? 
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INTERVIEW WORKSHEET – TRANSNET 
Contact Name  
Title:        Telephone Number: 
Firm:  
Location: 
Interview Date:      Time:  
 
Department of Public Enterprise  
 
 
 Where does Transnet derive its authority to carry out its economic regulation from? 
Constitution, law or statute, Government decree, contract or Combination of the above?  
 What measures have been taken by the Department of State Enterprise to ensure that Transnet 
provides an equitable service to all strategic sectors of the economy? 
 Has the parliament passed any framework laws aiming at reforming the rail sector? 
 Have there been any serious disputes or controversies involving Transnet operational services 
in the movement of freight were the DPE had to intervene? Which sectors involved?  
 What are your biggest concerns with the way some of these state enterprises like Transnet 
operate in terms of their economic regulatory framework?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
